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How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy 
Reva B. Siegel 
We are about to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut,1 a 
1965 case in which the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law that 
criminalized the use of contraception, in the process giving birth to the modern 
right to privacy. From Griswold’s understanding of “liberty” grew the right to 
make decisions about abortion, and the right to engage in same-sex sex, with-
out coercion by the criminal law. How has our understanding of the Constitu-
tion’s protection for “liberty” come to include sex and marriage, whether sex in 
marriage, or same-sex marriage?  
In what follows, I will consider debates over the right to contraception and 
its progeny at three points in history: in the 1960s when the Court first decided 
the Griswold case; in 1980s “culture war” struggles over Griswold during the 
Reagan era; and in current conflicts over the right to privacy—in the recently 
decided Hobby Lobby case2 and in continuing struggles over same-sex couples’ 
right to marry. The story illustrates how the making of constitutional meaning 
occurs all around us, not only in formal processes of constitution-making or in 
acts of constitutional interpretation by the Court, but also in day-to-day de-
bates among ordinary Americans. Importantly, Griswold’s story shows how 
deeply the Constitution’s meaning is shaped by conflict as well as by consent. 
Griswold’s story demonstrates how conflict over the right to privacy—one of 
the most fiercely contested rights in the modern constitutional canon—has 
helped to entrench the right to privacy, to make it endure, and to imbue it with 
evolving meaning.  
i .  griswold  born  
Neither contraception nor abortion was banned at the nation’s founding. It 
was after the Civil War that the federal government enacted the 1873 Comstock 
 
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
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Act, which criminalized contraception and abortion together as obscenity.3 An-
thony Comstock and his supporters judged “obscene” contraception, abortion, 
and other practices that would free sex from the purpose of procreation in mar-
riage. Many states enacted versions of the Comstock statute, including Con-
necticut in 1879.4 
The Victorian understanding of sexuality and family life that supported 
bans on contraception began to erode by the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. In World War I, the federal government authorized the use of condoms 
to protect military men from the threat of venereal disease.5 Growing numbers 
of newly enfranchised women joined or supported a movement for birth con-
trol.6 Government officials began to read federal and state bans on contracep-
tion as containing implicit exceptions for protecting health.7 By mid-century, 
social scientists were informing the public about the wide variation in hetero- 
and homosexual practice, changing popular understandings of “normal” sex in 
the process.8 
If evolving sexual mores and the efforts of the birth control movement were 
essential pre-conditions to Griswold, so, too, was a transatlantic debate among 
elites about the role of the criminal law in enforcing sexual morals. In 1955, 
U.S. law professor Herbert Wechsler led a prominent “model penal code” 
commission in drafting a report that for the first time omitted sodomy, stating 
that “[n]o harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in atypi-
cal sex practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of pri-
vate morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities.”9 In 1957, Eng-
 
3. An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles 
of Immoral Use, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873). On the passage of the federal Comstock law, see 
ANDREA TONE, DEVICES AND DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 13-24 
(2002). On abortion law in the nineteenth century, see JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: 
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY (1979). 
4. For more on the passage of the Connecticut Comstock law, entitled “An Act to Amend an 
Act concerning Offenses against Decency, Morality, and Humanity,” see Carol Flora Brooks, 
The Early History of the Anti-Contraceptive Laws in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 18 AM. Q. 3 
(1966). See also C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 46-47 (1972); and 
JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 7-8 (2005).  
5. TONE, supra note 3, at 106-07. 
6. LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: THE HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLI-
TICS IN AMERICA 171-210 (2004). 
7. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.  
F. 349 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-right 
[http://perma.cc/ZV72-CLRS]. 
8. See, e.g., ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953); ALFRED KINSEY, 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHN-
SON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966). 
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmt. at 277-78 (Proposed Official Draft 1955). 
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land’s Wolfenden Commission made headlines by proposing to repeal criminal 
bans on sodomy as infringing on sexual relations that were properly “pri-
vate.”10 In the ensuing debate over the Commission’s report, Lord Patrick 
Devlin defended the use of the criminal law to enforce public morals,11 while 
H.L.A. Hart countered by emphasizing the importance of protecting a sphere 
of liberty, of individual privacy, from the reach of the criminal law.12 This de-
bate about whether and when it was appropriate to criminalize sex would soon 
spread from public policy and political philosophy to constitutional law. 
In 1961, a case challenging Connecticut’s law prohibiting contraception 
reached the Supreme Court in Poe v. Ullman.13 However, at Justice Frankfur-
ter’s urging, a sharply divided Court refused to decide it for want of a prosecu-
tion.14 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Harlan countered that a threat of prosecu-
tion made the case ripe for decision. Even as Justice Harlan seemed to side with 
Devlin in affirming the state’s authority to regulate sexual morals—including 
“laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices”15—Justice 
Harlan urged that “the most substantial claim which these married persons 
press is their right to enjoy the privacy of their marital relations free of the enquiry of 
the criminal law.”16  
In the wake of the Poe decision, doctors, lawyers, and professors of Yale 
University worked with Estelle Griswold of the local Planned Parenthood clinic 
and with lawyers of the national birth control movement and the American 
Civil Liberties Union to set up a test case challenging Connecticut’s ban on 
contraception.17 In 1965, the Supreme Court declared Connecticut’s ban on 
contraception unconstitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut.18 While lawyers of 
 
10. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND 
PROSTITUTION (1963). 
11. PATRICK DEVLIN, ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959). 
12. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 14-15 (1963) (stating that The Wolfenden 
Report’s recommendation that the law against homosexual practices between consenting 
adults in private should be relaxed was based on the principle that “[t]here must remain a 
realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s 
business” and noting that the American Law Institute had recommended “that all consensu-
al relations between adults in private . . . be excluded from the scope of the criminal law”). 
13. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
14. Id. at 501-02, 508; Ryan C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155, 
2163-65 (2014). 
15. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
16. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).  
17. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF 
ROE V. WADE 196-229 (1994); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 93-
119 (2013); Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Be-
fore Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 936-38 (1990). 
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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the period had begun to articulate new frameworks—focusing on privacy be-
tween consenting adults and even sex equality—the Court’s decision followed 
Justice Harlan’s lead and emphasized the privacy of the marriage relationship.19 
Justices Stewart and Black strenuously dissented. Because the right to privacy 
lacked a sufficient basis in the Constitution, they argued, the Court had 
usurped the democratic prerogatives of the people of Connecticut.20 
i i .  griswold  entrenched  
The Griswold opinion became deeply entrenched in our constitutional tradi-
tion, first by judicial elaboration in Supreme Court decisions and then, just as 
importantly, by political conflict over those decisions.  
Over the ensuing decades, pushed by growing movements debating the de-
criminalization of abortion and the decriminalization of same-sex sex,21 the Su-
preme Court progressively expanded Griswold’s reach, first extending the right 
to contraception to unmarried persons in the 1972 case of Eisenstadt v. Baird22 
and then declaring in the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade that the “right of privacy . . . 
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy.”23  
As we know, controversy escalated around these decisions. Architects of the 
New Right appealed to conflicts over race, sex, and other “social issues” of the 
1970s to attract traditional Democratic voters to the ranks of the Republican 
 
19. Id. at 485-86. Catherine Roraback, who brought several cases against the Connecticut law, 
including Griswold, has pointed out that briefs written before the Supreme Court appeal in 
Poe did not invoke privacy but instead focused on rights to life, liberty, health, and to mari-
tal relationships free of government intrusion (without mention of privacy). See Catherine 
G. Roraback, Griswold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 395, 399-
400 (1989). For alternative frameworks, see Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a 
Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965) (detailing five grounds on which the Court could have 
decided Griswold); supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing claims about privacy 
between consenting adults); see also Siegel & Siegel, supra note 7, at 355-56 (discussing sex 
equality claims in the ACLU’s amicus brief in Griswold). 
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511-13 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 530-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
21. For an account of the movements debating decriminalization of abortion preceding Eisen-
stadt, see, for example, GARROW, supra note 17, at 407-24; LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. 
SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SU-
PREME COURT’S RULING (2d ed. 2012). For a description of the movements debating decrim-
inalization of same-sex sex, see for example, JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL 
COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-
1970 (1983); MARC STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (2012). 
22. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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Party.24 This strategy helped elect Ronald Reagan President in 1980 on a cam-
paign platform promising to appoint “judges at all levels of the judiciary who 
respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.”25  
Once in office, President Reagan set out to nominate judges who would roll 
back liberal judicial decisions, elevating William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and 
appointing Sandra Day O’Connor and Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court.26 
With these appointments, the Court voted 5-4 in Bowers v. Hardwick to limit 
privacy doctrine and to uphold a state law criminalizing sodomy.27 Bowers sig-
naled that Roe’s future was at risk.  
The fate of the constitutional right to privacy was decisively shaped by 
President Reagan’s nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 
1987. Judge Bork was prominent as a critic of civil rights law28 and as an 
originalist who believed that the equal protection sex discrimination cases of 
the Burger Court were contrary to the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Framers.29 At the time of his appointment, Judge Bork was famous for his early 
criticism of Griswold as an “unprincipled” usurpation of democratic authority 
unauthorized by the Constitution’s text30—a critique he reiterated as a judge on 
the D.C. Circuit in an opinion with then-Judge Scalia upholding the Navy’s 
discharge of a gay service member as consistent with equal protection and due 
process.31  
Judge Bork’s nomination was fiercely opposed by the civil rights move-
ment, the feminist movement, those who supported reproductive freedom, and 
those who supported gay rights.32 The Senate Judiciary Committee, led by 
then-Senator Joe Biden, held extensive hearings on Judge Bork’s constitutional 
jurisprudence. In long-running colloquies, Senator Biden probed Judge Bork’s 
 
24. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Feature, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Ques-
tions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052-59 (2011).  
25. Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (2015), http://www.presidency 
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844 [http://perma.cc/J4B2-4569]. 
26. DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 133-55 (1999). 
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
28. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 22; Rob-
ert H. Bork, The Unpersuasive Bakke Decision, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1978, at 8. 
29. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 159-61 (1987) [hereinafter 
Bork Hearings]; ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA 241 (2007). 
30. See Bork Hearings, supra note 29, at 115; Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971). 
31. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
32. See BRONNER, supra note 29, at 153-57; MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE 
PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989). 
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constitutional views with special attention to privacy, asking whether Judge 
Bork would allow the government to tell “a married couple . . . what they can 
or cannot do about birth control in their bedroom.”33 After days of televised 
hearings, many Senators and commentators pronounced Judge Bork as “out-
side the mainstream,” polls ran against Judge Bork’s confirmation, and the 
Senate voted decisively with 42 senators voting in favor of, and 58 voting 
against, confirming him to the Supreme Court.34  
Ultimately, Reagan nominated and the Senate confirmed Justice Anthony 
Kennedy.35 Not only Justice Kennedy, but also subsequent conservative nomi-
nees including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, affirmed Griswold dur-
ing their confirmation hearings.36 In short, the wide-ranging conflict over 
Judge Bork’s confirmation helped entrench Griswold. After this great conflict, 
subsequent nominees concluded that Griswold, like Brown, was part of the con-
stitutional canon—accepted as mainstream. 
Yet another consequence of the conflict over Judge Bork’s confirmation was 
a crucial shift in the composition of the Supreme Court. The substitution of 
Justice Kennedy for Judge Bork matters in numerous areas of law, but perhaps 
none so prominently as in the Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey to 
limit but uphold Roe37 and in the decisions in which the Court has narrowly 
voted to protect the rights of gay people—decisions that Justice Kennedy has 
repeatedly authored.38 Had Judge Bork been appointed to the Court instead of 
Justice Kennedy, these gay rights decisions would surely have been more nar-
rowly crafted, and one or more of the cases would almost certainly have come 
out the other way. 
 
33. Bork Hearings, supra note 29, at 116 (1987); see also PERTSCHUK & SCHAETZEL, supra note 32, 
at 144 (discussing privacy as a focus for opponents of Judge Bork’s nomination). 
34. BRONNER, supra note 29 at 297; Philip Shenon, The Bork Hearings; Poll Finds Public Opposi-
tion to Bork is Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/24/us 
/the-bork-hearings-poll-finds-public-opposition-to-bork-is-growing.html [http://perma.cc 
/J3Q6-DJ54]; Senate’s Roll Call on the Bork Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1987, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1987/10/24/us/senate-s-roll-call-on-the-bork-vote.html [http://perma.cc 
/QZZ8-CWQB].  
35. YALOF, supra note 26, at 164-65 (1999); Maureen Hoch, Justice Anthony Kennedy, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 9, 2007, 8:14 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/law-jan 
-june07-kennedy [http://perma.cc/KM6G-DHEZ]. 
36. For discussion in the hearings of Justice Kennedy, see 134 Cong. Rec. S498-99 (daily ed. 
Feb. 1, 1988); for Chief Justice Roberts, see Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on 
the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 109th Cong. 207, 351, 372 (2005); for Justice Alito, see Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 109th Cong. 318, 318 (2006). 
37. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
38. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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i i i .  griswold today  
The Court’s decision in Griswold remains in contention today, perhaps 
most visibly in debates over abortion, but also in the debate over same-sex 
marriage. Some lower court decisions striking down state-law restrictions on 
same-sex marriage appeal to equal protection,39 while others are based on lib-
erty and reason that the Constitution protects the right to marry.40 These 
right-to-marry, liberty-based decisions descend from Griswold.41 (This is hard-
ly a surprise. In the era of Bork’s confirmation, the Reagan Justice Department 
warned that without the appointment of originalist judges, privacy could be 
used to permit “homosexual marriage or adoption of children by homosexu-
als.”42) 
One story we could tell is of ever-expanding constitutional protections for 
privacy.43 But despite Griswold’s entrenchment over the past fifty years, the law 
could yet change, and constitutional protections for privacy could contract or 
disappear. During the campaigns preceding the 2012 election, numerous Re-
publican candidates criticized contraception44—a theme continued in recent lit-
igation over the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, most prominently in Hob-
by Lobby.45 If a Republican President who believes a great wrong was done to 
 
39. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
40. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir. 2014) (“There can be little doubt that 
the right to marry is a fundamental liberty.”); see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-77 
(4th Cir. 2014) (invoking a fundamental right to marry under both the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses).  
41. The Tenth Circuit also looks to Griswold to rebut the argument that the purpose of marriage 
is procreation. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d at 1214 (asserting that the claim that “the right 
to marry is fundamental because it is linked to procreation is further undermined by the fact 
that individuals have a fundamental right to choose against reproduction” and citing Gris-
wold).  
42. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: 
CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-42 (1988). 
43. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Griswold’s Progeny: Assisted Reproduction, Procreative Liberty, and 
Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org 
/forum/griswolds-progeny [http://perma.cc/79CX-7QWQ] (showing Griswold’s capacity to 
support access to the assisted reproductive technologies that have become central to same-
sex family formation). 
44. See, e.g., Ann Gerhart, Birth Control as an Election Issue? Why?, WASH. POST, Feb. 20,  
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birth-control-as-election 
-issue-why/2012/02/17/gIQASW6kPR_story.html [http://perma.cc/VRA8-4YS3]. 
45. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See generally Douglas NeJaime & 
Reva B. Siegel, Feature, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560658 [http://perma 
.cc/5C9W-5XZC] (examining complicity-based conscience claims concerning sex, reproduc-
tion, and marriage advanced by Christians mobilized in cross-denominational organizations 
and by the Republican Party).  
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Judge Bork is elected in 2016, and if that Republican has an opportunity to re-
place sitting Justices, we may yet see a new Supreme Court that repudiates the 
right to privacy first recognized in Griswold.  
Or perhaps conflict over privacy will continue to discipline and entrench 
Griswold, as it did in the era of the Bork hearings. If this transpires, how will 
privacy contract and how will it expand? Which protections for sexual expres-
sion, for reproduction, and for family life might Griswold yet grow to guaran-
tee?  
 
Reva B. Siegel is Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University. I 
thank Doug NeJaime for comments on the draft. For research assistance, she is indebt-
ed to Allison Day, Stephanie Krent, and Seguin Strohmeier. This Essay derives from 
remarks given at the Association of American Law Schools’s 2015 Annual Meeting in 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Preferred Citation: Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 
124 YALE L.J. F. 316 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-conflict 
-entrenched-the-right-to-privacy. 
 
